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
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC COERCION:
From The Sea

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



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ABSTRACT

Sanctions are defined as, "anything which serves to move a person to observe or refrain from a given mode of conduct."^{*} For sanctions to be effective, there must be credible enforcement mechanisms in place. Policy makers often utilize economic coercion, backed by the threat of military force, to elicit compliance. The employment of naval forces, to prevent movement of critical supplies, has been used throughout history to forward political or military objectives in time of war. In recent years, military forces have been called upon to enforce sanctions designed to promote peace and enhance regional stability. Using military forces to apply economic coercion during peacetime is a significant paradigm shift. Operational commanders will need to consider more than the 'principles of war' when planning sanctions enforcement. These operations fall under the broad umbrella labeled military operations other than war (MOOTW). Joint Pub 3-07 lists six principles that should be considered when engaging in MOOTW. They are; objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. While all are relevant to conducting sanctions enforcement, they fall short of providing a complete group of principles that could guide planning for economic coercion at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This paper will address the six principles of MOOTW, as they apply to economic coercion. In addition, it will suggest four others; mass, economy of force, maneuver, and simplicity. Thoughtful consideration of these ten principles will assist planners involved in economic coercion, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

^{*}"sanction," New Websters Dictionary, 1992 ed: 334.

INTRODUCTION

The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership remains as strong as ever.

-President Clinton

During the cold war, military and diplomatic issues were much simpler than they are today. The world was polarized with the Soviet Union maintaining rigid control over Warsaw pact countries and engaged in a game of mutual nuclear deterrence and bi-polar global influence with the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union has essentially removed the central security challenge that has shaped U.S. armed forces, diplomatic efforts, and security imperatives for the last half century.¹ No single threat the nation faces today is by itself as menacing as that once posed by the USSR. Instead, there now exists the potential for a number of smaller, more complex, and regionally dispersed challenges driven by such things as violence within multiethnic states, interstate conflict, the rise of destabilizing ideologies, and the gross violation of human rights.²

The National Security Strategy outlines how the administration intends to shape military forces to deal with perceived regional threats abroad. U.S. military forces must remain capable of supporting unilateral actions to protect vital interests. As the world's only existing super power it is becoming increasingly evident that those interests are no longer so clearly defined. Regional conflicts will involve interests that our allies or the international community may consider vital to their security. As outlined in the National Security Strategy:

Whether the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the former Soviet empire or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face demand cooperative, multinational solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S. strategy is one that seeks to ensure U.S. influence over and participation in collective decisionmaking in a wide and growing range of circumstances.³ (Underlining added)

Increasingly, military forces must be prepared to undertake non-traditional roles such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and a wide range of military operations other-than-war (MOOTW) to resolve regional conflicts to entice the political and military leadership of other

countries to behave in constructive ways which are conducive to America's national interests. In MOOTW, the Navy may be called on to bring decisive punitive action to bear, exemplified by the use of tomahawk cruise missiles to quiet Saddam Hussein's death threats of former President Bush. Naval participation in operations aimed at influencing, rather than coercing through force, will occur at a much greater frequency.⁴ One of the primary ways naval forces contribute to regional influence and stability is through embargo operations designed to enforce economic sanctions.

This paper will focus on ten principles that apply to planning and conducting military operations to enforce sanctions.

PLANNING FOR SUCCESS

Our naval forces contribute decisively to U.S. global leadership and are vital to shaping an environment that enhances our national security. A strong naval team - capable of deterrence, war at sea and from the sea, and operations other than war - is essential to that effort.⁵

- NDP 1

The use of maritime forces to establish a quarantine, embargo or blockade affects decisionmakers at all levels of command. At the strategic level, national and multinational security objectives and guidance are determined and decisions are made concerning which instruments of national power (i.e. diplomatic, economic, military, etc.) to bring to bear to achieve desired ends. Increasingly, the U.S. and multinational (alliance or ad hoc) leaders will seek to prevent and contain regional conflicts through economic and diplomatic measures backed by capable and credible military forces.⁶ A robust, forward deployed naval force capable of controlling the world's sea lanes gives the National Command Authority attractive options when appropriate responses to regional conflict resolution are being sought. Once it has been determined that economic sanctions are appropriate means toward fulfilling security objectives, the operational commander may be tasked with planning and executing an embargo

to enforce compliance. The general operational responsibilities associated with embargo operations are clearly delineated in the Universal Joint Task List:

OP 1.4.2 Plan and Execute Quarantine/Embargo. To carry out acts designed to exclude specific items such as offensive military weapons and associated material from movement into or out of a state. This task includes the planning and execution of operational tasks and synchronization of tactical tasks which compose the quarantine. It includes the planning of branches and sequels involved if the action goes beyond a quarantine, either as a result of a changing situation or enemy action. (JP 3-0)⁷

To determine how to accomplish assigned tasks the operational commander often turns to joint doctrine for guidance and crafts OPLANS to delineate "who" is actually charged with performing the tasks.⁸ Sanctions enforcement is a mission that naval forces are increasingly called upon to conduct. Clear, concise doctrine dealing with how to best perform these missions is virtually non-existent. The recent approval of Joint Pub 3-07 is an excellent start in attempting to define principles which apply across the wide range of MOOTW, but it falls short in completely addressing the complexity of the issue.⁹ Part of the problem is that there is no cookie-cutter approach to sanctions enforcement. What was appropriate in one instance may prove ineffective in a different theater of operations or under different diplomatic conditions. The partnerships created in enforcing international sanctions may involve military forces with which we have had little or no interaction in the past. Trying to fit the use of maritime forces for sanction enforcement into a neatly defined doctrine of war or operations other than war is not as easy as it may seem. Although sanctions enforcement is mentioned in several doctrinal publications as operations short of war designed to deter and prevent conflict, the division between maritime enforcement of sanctions (embargo) to win the peace and maritime actions designed to totally isolate an enemy's sea lines of communication (blockade) to win the war is ill defined doctrinally. Joint Pub 3-07 explains the difference between MOOTW and war:

MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests.¹⁰

Using the definition above, it becomes clear that the main difference between MOOTW and war, where maritime enforcement of sanctions is concerned, is whether or not you include the word "combat". Clearly, embargoes are large-scale, sustained operations designed to achieve security objectives (national, multinational (alliance or ad hoc), or international (UN mandates)) or to protect interests, where blockades simply involve the use of increased force levels (combat) to achieve the same objectives. A body choosing to seek economic sanctions as a non-violent means to exert diplomatic leverage in a region is in reality conducting "economic coercion" against those at whom the sanctions are directed. Although there is no clear cut command structure, force package, or cookbook solution to embargo operations that will ensure success in every situation, a clear understanding and application of both the principles of war and the principles of MOOTW concerning maritime embargo will clarify planning efforts.

TEN PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC COERCION

Principles of War. The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.¹¹

-- Joint Pub 3-0

Joint Pub 3-0 lists nine "principles of war"; objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. There are six principles for operations other than war listed in the same publication; objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.¹² Joint doctrine for the conduct of economic coercion must begin with defining a group of principles that could guide planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The principles of operations other than war delineated above are certainly applicable to the conduct of sanctions enforcement. These principles of

MOOTW are commonly known by the acronym SLURPO. Economic coercion is conducted in a gray area along the conflict continuum where the potential to cross the line between MOOTW and war is great. SLURPO, while providing a valid starting point, falls well short of an enduring "bedrock of doctrine." In addition to SLURPO, the principles of mass, economy of force, maneuver, and simplicity combine to form a more appropriate "bedrock" for U.S. economic coercion doctrine. Each principle of economic coercion will be discussed as it pertains to maritime enforcement of sanctions.

OBJECTIVE

The President of the United States announced that the U.S. Navy would be employed, either unilaterally or as part of a multinational force, to enforce these (UN mandated) sanctions by interdicting all maritime traffic carrying goods to and from Iraq....the U.S. Navy will be the chief participant--and key to its success.¹³

This principle of economic coercion is clearly the cornerstone of military doctrine across the entire conflict continuum. Without a clearly defined objective the operational commander has no planning guidance or definable measures of effectiveness. The decision to employ economic coercion is made at the strategic level and only after a thorough analysis of its potential effectiveness in accomplishing strategic objectives. This strategy was deemed appropriate against Iraq because of that country's dependence on foreign trade of manufactured goods and food in exchange for petroleum products.¹⁴ The strategic objective of the sanctions leveled against Iraq has evolved significantly since the embargo began in 1990. Prior to Desert Storm economic coercion was directed at Iraqi leadership to compel them to leave Kuwait.

"I do not want to add to the suffering of the people of Iraq. The United Nations has put binding sanctions in place not to punish the Iraqi people but as a peaceful means to convince your leadership to withdraw from Kuwait. That decision is in the hands of Saddam Hussein."¹⁵

-- President George Bush

Presently, strategic goals concerning Iraq serve to promote stability in the region by limiting its military capacity and encouraging a change of the current regime.¹⁶ Whether the

desired end state remains the same during an embargo operation or increases in scope as it has in the Gulf, clear communication of the strategic objective to the operational commander is key to success.

Once the operational commander has a clear understanding of the strategic objective, he may begin to plan and execute operations designed to accomplish his mission. In the case described above, the means to carry out the strategic objective is very clearly stated by President Bush - enforce sanctions by interdicting all maritime traffic carrying goods to and from Iraq. This mission is clearly stated, there are tangible measures of effectiveness (is shipping getting out of or into Iraq), and it is linked to a definable end state (Iraqi compliance with sanctions). It will be up to the operational commander to plan and execute the maritime interdiction operations in a manner which contributes to the strategic objective.

In economic coercion, it is important to communicate the objective to the individual or group of individuals that you are trying to influence. The targets of economic pressure cannot capitulate if they are not fully aware of what constitutes compliance. You must also make your intentions and objectives known to all countries who conduct maritime trade with the sanctioned country so they may decide whether or not to comply with the sanctions. This is a very different concept than when 'objective' is discussed as a principle of war. Disclosing objectives to your enemy in wartime would be disastrous and run counter to the principles of surprise and security.

The operational commander must continually assess whether or not the economic coercion plan is achieving the strategic mission. A maritime embargo may achieve operational success in completely shutting down sea lines of communication (SLOCs) but, if the country is free to trade via air or land routes, the economic coercion plan has failed to achieve the strategic objective. Appropriate branches and sequels should be planned and executed throughout the operation with attainment of the strategic objective as the focus.

Unity of Effort

Bosnia demonstrated that a piecemeal response to a deep-seated problem fools no one and accomplishes little; what is needed is an integrated strategy using all the instruments of power available to policy-makers.¹⁷

U.S. involvement in future economic coercion operations will most likely involve working with other nations, either formal alliance partners or through an ad hoc coalition, to enforce sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. is prepared to act unilaterally but only if vital interests are at stake. The National Security Strategy clearly states the President's position on regional matters. . ."especially on those matters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportionate commitment from them. Working together increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions. . ."¹⁸

Clearly defined sanctions provide tangible and substantive objectives on which all players may focus. Once the common goals are established, it is possible to have several military units involved in an operation without unity of command. These types of arrangements can be quite successful as evidenced by the early stages of the embargo in the Adriatic where Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces were operating independently of each other toward a common effort in operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigilance.¹⁹ The efforts to isolate Iraq, prior to the commencement of Desert Storm, were another example of unity of effort being more important than unity of command in economic coercion operations. In the Persian Gulf U.S. forces were joined by Canadian and Australian units while in the Gulf of Oman French, Dutch, Spanish and Belgian units joined forces with U.S. units to carry out the maritime interdiction. The comments of VADM Henry H. Mauz Jr., head of U.S. CENTCOM naval forces during this period, underscored the role unity of effort plays in such operations. "We have got close cooperation and agreement about who operates where, how we communicate, how we pass (shipping) contacts on (to each other). . . . We're working very effectively without a common commander in this intercept operation."²⁰ (Underlining added).

The operational commander must understand that naval units, working together to conduct interdiction, are only part of the force required to conduct successful economic coercion (except in the rare case of an island nation without an airstrip). Land and air interdiction must be used appropriately as well. Neighboring nations and trading partners must be encouraged to comply with the sanctions if they are neutral to regional stability efforts (the Dominican Republic's role in supplying Haiti with petroleum products rendered economic coercion efforts ineffective in achieving strategic goals). There must be sufficient intelligence available at the operational and strategic level to assess whether or not the coercion efforts are having their desired effects. If smuggling is rampant there may be the need for deployment of more forces to beef up border patrols. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) forces will probably play an important role if operations become protracted and the civilian population starts to feel the pinch of the embargo before their government capitulates. Successful economic coercion is an all hands effort that will probably not involve unity of command. To encourage unity of effort in such operations is to encourage success.

There will be other government and non-governmental agencies involved in efforts to achieve the common objective. These groups, although not under the command of the CINC or JTF commander, are part of an increasingly diverse tool box available to policy makers dedicated to accomplishment of national objectives through **unity of effort**.

SECURITY

JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation.²¹

Joint Pub 3-07

The principle of security becomes very complex when applying it to maritime interdiction. The obvious aspect of force protection immediately springs to mind. Italian Admiral Enrico Martinotti, commander of the NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANFORMED) during operation Maritime Guard, discussed the importance of force protection when dealing with even a limited Serbian naval force capable of responding with three frigates, three Heroj-

class submarines, several mini-subs, and several fast patrol boats with anti-ship missile capability.

"In this operation, shipboard self-defense weapons are essential. We try to find the best compromise between force-defense and self-defense for vessels operating in this area. Ships that don't have the most modern self-protection systems are normally put close to a ship that is able to provide force defense. Usually, a medium-range missile ship--from the U.S., Britain, or Italy is used as a force-defense ship."²²

Although the positioning of ships in a defensive formation gets into the tactical aspects of economic coercion, the operational commander must be aware that operating in the coastal waters of a state to enforce sanctions decreases the time available for naval forces to react to a hostile act directed at them. If the ships need to be located in close proximity of the shoreline to effectively enforce the embargo, the operational commander must ensure that there are the right types of ships in the formation to provide adequate security to the force. Ships engaged in maritime interdiction are also vulnerable to attack from aircraft. Dedicated anti-air protection, either in the form of friendly fighter support or an anti-air-warfare (AAW) capable ship, must figure prominently in planning when a credible, anti-surface capable, air force exists.

Accurate intelligence on the sanctioned leadership's willingness and ability to bring force to bear against the interdiction forces is vital to planning the operation. This information must be continually assessed throughout the operation especially if the embargo is being effective. Early indications that the leadership is prepared to undertake desperate action, as result of economic coercion, may warrant an increased security posture among assigned forces.

The need for operations security is a must when U.S. membership in regional alliances and ad hoc coalitions is becoming more frequent. The potential is very high that in the future the U.S. may find itself at serious odds with a former member of a temporary alliance or coalition. Recent threats of terrorist attacks aimed at Americans in Riyad,²³ anti-western sentiment, and

the existence of fundamentalist elements calling for a stricter Islamic government in Saudi Arabia, could lead to strained relationships with this Desert Storm coalition partner.²⁴

RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary.²⁵

-- Joint Pub 3-07

Without clearly defined rules of engagement (ROE) the most capable surface ship is a sitting duck for attack by a belligerent force. The naval commander must have well defined, appropriate ROE to successfully provide for the security of his ship and his men. The operational commander must establish ROE that do not leave forces vulnerable or inhibit the judgement of their unit commanders. Ad hoc coalitions, consisting of partners with whom we may have little experience operating, bring with them varying perspectives, agendas, ideologies and cultures which further complicates the ROE issue.²⁶

As defined in Webster's Dictionary, the word enforce means "to impose (action) upon."²⁷ Clear ROE must also exist to empower naval forces conducting economic coercion to use appropriate force if attempts are made to break the embargo. Naval forces charged with embargo operations, and not empowered with the right to use force to stop ships, will not accomplish their mission.

PERSEVERANCE

Some may ask, 'Why act now? Why not wait?' The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.²⁸

-- President Bush

It will never be known whether or not Saddam Hussein could have been compelled to leave Kuwait through the continued application of economic coercion. There was a great deal of debate on the topic prior to Desert Storm. The question of how patient you have to be when applying sanctions before abandoning them for more severe measures is not easily

answered. The U.S. is still engaged in sanctions enforcement against Iraq and probably will be for the foreseeable future. Embargo operations in the Otranto strait are ongoing and have been a turnover item for battlegroups entering the Sixth Fleet AOR since their inception. The collective force of all the instruments of power applied in the former Yugoslavia seem to be finally having an effect in the area. The Dayton accord was signed by the principles and there is presently a cease fire being monitored by a multinational peacekeeping Implementation Force (IFOR).

Military forces trained to win wars quickly, decisively, and violently are hard pressed to embrace a principle which requires protracted application of military capability and may take years to produce desired results.²⁹ The operational commander must always focus on the assigned mission and realize that his forces may be used as a blunt instrument towards the achievement of long term political objectives.

Protracted embargo operations can adversely affect the morale and effectiveness of the forces involved. The operational commander must ensure that there are sufficient forces in theater to complete the mission and still allow for a reasonable schedule of port visits for liberty and ship maintenance. Perishable warfighting skills will quickly deteriorate if the operational commander does not exercise the entire force and encourage training at the unit level to maintain the fighting edge.

LEGITIMACY

In the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, no other Gulf state had the capability to deal with the Iraqi threat. The United States, on the other hand, had the capability to do so. In this case, the UN framework made the creation of a coalition force of twenty-eight countries possible. This in turn, gave legitimacy to US access to the region.³⁰

-- MGEN R. J. O'Lear, USAF

Legitimacy in economic coercion operations is instrumental to success. Border states and other nations who conduct trade with the sanctioned group will be far more supportive of military action that they perceive to be legally, morally, or ethically legitimate. Protracted

embargo operations that have an adverse effect on the population of the sanctioned nation can quickly change perceptions of legitimacy in both the international community and at home.

The media is a powerful tool in creating or destroying the legitimacy of an operation. A recent report of the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen raised questions of the legitimacy of forward presence in Okinawa. How an operational commander presents himself and the forces he commands can determine how the entire operation is perceived both in the region and in the States.

MASS

To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time...Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.³¹

-- Joint Pub 3-0

The principle of mass is not included in Joint Pub 3-07 as a principle of MOOTW. It does have applications in economic coercion and warrants consideration when planning for operations of this type. This principle has obvious ties with the principle of security. Carrier based aircraft on 30 minute surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) alert, prepared to protect the ships conducting embargo operations off the coast of Montenegro, are certainly capable of massing firepower to achieve a decisive effect in a short period of time. An airborne SUCAP, positioned over the embargo flotilla, would certainly provide a more rapid response but would quickly become a severe drain on resources and personnel. The operational commander must weigh the risks, analyze the threat and establish a realistic alert posture which is capable of massing joint forces in response to a hostile act or hostile intent. The mix of forces needs to be addressed. Who picks up the alerts when the carrier is in port? What weapons are appropriate in the theater to counter the threat? During the Eisenhower Battle Group Med 1-95 cruise, weapons loads for SUCAP missions were determined by the Commander, Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440). Whether or not the operational commander feels the

need to dictate weapons loads, he must retain the ability to mass appropriate firepower should naval forces engaged in sanctions enforcement come under fire.

In economic coercion operations involving stopping trade along a long land border or a series of rivers, failure to consider massing forces where the smugglers were trying to cross would result in failure. To be effective these forces must be able to identify the interlopers through a network which provides sufficient intelligence and warning (I & W) and then have the capability to intercept them. Helicopters and fast riverine patrol craft could provide the agility and speed required to mass appropriate forces where and when they were needed most. Applying the principle of mass in embargo operations will increase the security, effectiveness, and efficiency of forces involved, and may result in a decrease in time required to reach the desired strategic end state.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts....in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.³²

-- Joint Pub 3-0

Economy of force should be in the back of the operational commanders mind when conducting economic coercion because these operations could quickly become the secondary effort should conflict arise in another part of the AOR. The planning of branches and sequels for quarantine/embargo operations must include consideration of a sharp reduction in force structure due to shifting priorities or objectives. If the NCA still desires to persevere in the embargo operation, the operational commander must accurately assess his ability to continue the mission with the remaining forces. If the JFC determines that he can no longer accomplish the mission with the forces remaining, he must communicate this assessment up the chain of command with recommendations on how to rectify the situation.

MANEUVER

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver - or threaten delivery of - the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.³³

-- Joint Pub 3-0

Maritime forces engaged in embargo operations are exercising sea control. The use of geographic features to secure a positional advantage applies at sea as well as on land. Sealing off a body of water is much easier when there is a natural choke point through which all traffic must flow. Locating the Sharp Guard forces in the Otranto strait was no accident. Naval forces were maneuvered to secure and retain a positional advantage over merchant traffic. In mountainous regions, the same principle applies, establish a positional advantage by deploying your forces at the point where vehicular traffic must cross.

SIMPLICITY

The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.³⁴

-- Joint Pub 3-0

An operational commander should demand simplicity whether engaged in war or MOOTW. This principle wasn't included with MOOTW but certainly applies to maritime embargo operations. U.S. Navy battlegroups go through an extensive work up period prior to an overseas deployment to ensure that they are fully mission capable and ready to operate as a unit. The work up phase is analogous to learning to walk before you run. Workups start with the basics, then gradually become more complex. The result of this intense training is a fully integrated fighting force capable of meeting any threat head on. Sanctions enforcement with an ad hoc coalition, which is unfamiliar with each others strengths, weaknesses, and standard operating procedures, will demand simplicity in execution. The high rate in turnover of ships and personnel over the course of a protracted maritime embargo will require the overall plan to remain simple to allow the newest vessel in the flotilla or the least combat ready vessel to contribute without degrading the effectiveness of the embargo.

CONCLUSIONS

A man-of-war is the best ambassador.
-- Oliver Cromwell, 1650

Credible, combat ready naval forces are an awesome tool which our nations leaders increasingly use to create conditions for peace in unstable regions. Enforcement of UN sanctions through economic coercion is a type of operation that does not fit neatly in the box called MOOTW as defined in Joint Pub 3-07. In developing a commander's estimate on how to best conduct economic coercion the principles of mass, economy of force, maneuver, and simplicity must be given weight in addition to the six principles of MOOTW Joint Pub 3-07 espouses. The principles of economic coercion should not be viewed as a checklist. Nor should they be considered all inclusive. The army tenets of operation described in FM 100-5 (versatility, initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization) are also excellent points to ponder when planning embargo operations.

The navy is fortunate in that involvement in sanctions enforcement operations, does not involve a total degradation of our warfighting skills. The mission is still 'sea control'. The watch stander on the bridge can still plot an intercept on his maneuvering board. The operations specialist in combat can still track targets on radar and maintain a skunk board. The proximity to coastal areas requires intense navigation and seamanship skills. The bottom line is that, when the military is engaged in sanctions enforcement, it is incumbent on the operational commander to consider the unique nature of these operations and apply the principles of economic coercion correctly.

ENDNOTES

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² Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Richard H. Shultz Jr., Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1993) 3.

³ U.S. President, 8.

⁴ CNO Fellows, Crisis Response and Influence: The Value of Overseas Military Presence (Newport, RI: Chief of Naval Operations, Strategic Studies Group XIII, 1994) 1,6,15.

⁵ Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 - Naval Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1994) 71.

⁶ U.S. President, 16.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List (Washington, D.C.: CJCSM 3500.04, 1995) 2-78.

⁸Ibid., 1-1.

⁹ Ann E. Story, Aryea Gottlieb, "Beyond the Range of Military Operations," Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 1995: 104.

¹⁰ Chairman, Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, D.C.: 1995) vii.

¹¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington D.C.: CJCS, Year) a-1.

¹²Ibid., A1-A3, V1.

¹³ E. W. Carter III, "Blockade," Proceedings, November 1990: 42.

¹⁴Ibid.,47.

¹⁵ George Bush, "Tracking The Storm - President Speaks to Nation," Military Review September 1991: Pages.

¹⁶ For synopsis of Iraqi compliance with U.N. Resolutions 883, 707, 687, 688, and 705 see figure 1 in appendix A,taken from "Gulf Security and Iraq's Uncertain Future." Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 95.

¹⁷ Andrew S. Dichter, Actions and Options in the Bosnian Conflict: A Strategic Analysis and a Strategic Approach Towards Conflict Resolution, diss., Air War College, 1994 (City: Air War College, 1994) Pages.

¹⁸ U.S. President, 13.

¹⁹ Tim Ripley, "Isolating Yugoslavia," International Defense Review October 1994: 75.

²⁰ John Burlage, "Allied Naval Blockade said Working Well Without Overall Chief," Air Force Times 22 October 1990: 35.

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²² John Roos, "Point Man in Yugoslav Embargo," Armed Forces Journal International May 1993: 29.

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²⁶ Drew A. Bennett, Anne F. MacDonald, "Coalition Rules of Engagement," Joint Force Quarterly Summer 1995: 124.

²⁷ "enforce," New Webster's Dictionary, 1992 ed.: 132.

²⁸ George Bush, np.

²⁹ Chairman Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, II-4.

³⁰ Pfaltzgraff, Schultz Jr., 27.

³¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, A-1.

³²Ibid., A-1

³³Ibid., A-2

³⁴Ibid., A-2.

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APPENDIX A

| Iraqi Compliance with U.N. Resolutions | | |
|---|---|--|
| no. 833 | ★ accept newly demarcated border with Kuwait | ► accepted |
| no. 707 | ★ complete disclosure of all WMD programs | ► partially fulfilled |
| no. 687 | ★ destroy all chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles over 150 kilometers and research/manufacturing facilities ★ not acquire or develop nuclear weapons ★ accept on-site inspection, verification, and monitoring for nuclear, biological, and nuclear missile facilities ★ repatriate Kuwaiti/third country nationals ★ return property stolen from Kuwait ★ end participation in/support for international terrorism ★ establish assurance of "peaceful intentions" | ► partially fulfilled ► nuclear facilities dismantled ► inspection system in place/partially functioning ► over 600 Kuwaitis still missing ► all property not yet returned ► unfulfilled ► unfulfilled |
| no. 688 | ★ end repression of Iraqi citizens/allow access to humanitarian organizations | ► unfulfilled |
| no. 705 | ★ pay compensation up to 30 percent of oil revenues to victims of Kuwaiti occupation | ► requires lifting oil embargo |

FIGURE 1